The purpose of this paper is to show sorne examples, and characteristics of the economies where, as a consequence of changes in the utility functions, the set of equilibria changes. These changes play a crucial role to understand the behavior of the economy as a system. An economy will be called singular if small changes in the tastes of t he consumers imply big changes in the set of equilibria. In this paper, we use the Negishi (1960) approach to model the economic system composed by a finite number of agents and goods, to do so we use the concepts of Morse and stable functions to characterize the singular economies.
l. Introduction
The object of this paper is to show sorne examples of pure exchange economies, where small changes in the tastes of the agents imply large changes in the behavior of the economic system. These kind of economies are called singular economies. In our work, the tastes of the agents are modelled by parametrized utility functions. Following the Negishi (1960) approach, we will characterize each economy by its excess utility function. Moreover, in this paper, each parametrized economy is characterized by a parametrized excess utility function. It is then possible to distinguish among economies by observing the different excess utility functions defined by different values of the parameters. Rigorously speaking, an economy is singular if in every one of its neighborhoods there exists another economy whose behavior is substantially different with respect to the behavior of the previously considered, this means that, in every neighborhood of the excess utility function that corresponds to the former economy, there exists another excess utility function that corresponds to another economy, such that this function displays a different topological behavior. Traditionally, the study of the singularities is made considering the utilities as given and endowments as parameters, see the pioneer article of Balasko (1978) . In our approach, we consider, firstly, endowments as fixed, and we analyze the changes in the b ehavior of the economies when the utility functions change.
In the traditional approach, it is well known that in a neighborhood of a singular economy, other economies with different number of Walrasian equilibria can be found, see Accinelli (1996) . This means that if utilities are fixed, in every neighborhoods of a certain endowment there will exist another endowment such that for the given utilities, the number of equilibria is different. We will see that this is also the behavior of a singular economy when we consider utilities as variables, and endowments fixed.
The use of the Negishi approach is determined by the object of this paper. In this approach the characterization of the Walrasian equilibrium set is given by the excess utility function. This function plays a fundamental role in our work because:
i) The utilities appear explicitly in the excess utility function ii) The zeroes of this function are in one to one correspondence with the Walrasian equilibria.
Then, changes in the utility functions appear to be directly related with changes in the Walrasian equilibrium set. In our approach, the singularity appears as a property of the utilities of consumers. This means that, the tastes of the consumers play crucial role when characterizing a singular economy.
We will consider the initial endowments as given, and we will show cases in which in a neighborhood of a given excess utility function, economies with a different number of equilibria exist. This means that, if the economy is singular in this sense, a little modification in the utilities of the consumers , or little mistakes in the measure or appreciation of their tastes, may give rise to an unforeseen behavior. The mathematical statement of this phenomenon is that in a neighborhood of a singular economy, represented by a specific excess utility function, a small perturbation of the parameters leads the system to different equilibria sets which are structurally diverse. To <leal with this type of changes in the metric space of the functions, we introduce the topology of the uniform convergence, and thereafter apply Morse functions to classify it as regular or singular economies, depending on its corresponding excess utility functions.
Note that all considerations that we will do in terms of the excess utility functions could be done in terms of the excess demand function. In the same way, we will use in this paper Morse theory, and the excess utility function to characterize the set of the two-agents, and Z-goods economies; using Morse theory, and the excess demand function it is possible to characterize n-agents, and 2-goods economies.
The order of the sections is as follows. Section 2 presents the definitions of regular and singular economies in the Negishi approach, and shows the principal economic consequences of the use of this approach. Section 3 contains examples of the effects of parametric changes in the behavior of the economic system. In section 4, the space function with topology of the uniform convergence, and the Morse functions are defined, and then used to classify economies. Here, we also introduce additional examples. The last section concludes the economic meaning of the relationship between the tastes of the consumers, and the behavior of the economic system. Sorne appendix appear at the end of the paper.
Regular and Singular Economies in the Negishi Approach
A pure exchange economic system is characterized by the set e: = { ui, wi, I} , where preferences are represented by the utility functions ui : IR~ -+IR, Vi E J , endowments of the agent i are denoted by the symbol Wi, and I is a finite index set. In our work we are assuming that preferences can be represented by utility functions, and X = IR~ is the consumption space of the agent i. Therefore we will deal only with economies with a finit e number of agents, and goods.
The social welfare function of an economy; W .A : IR+.
1 -+ IR defined as: If we are to consider cvcry P areto optima! allocation , we will need to consider cases where Aj = O for sorne j E { 1, 2, . .. , n}. In these cases the agents indexed in this subset will be out of the market. As utilities a re strictly increasing, the maximiza tion process implics that this agent will receive Xj = O. Since we consider each agent to have a non-null .endowment, this cannot be an cquilibrium allocation. Then we can restrict ourselves , without loss of generality, to consider only cases where . >-E .6.++ · Once the set of P a reto optima! allocations has bccn characterized, our next step is to choose the elements x* in the Pareto optima! set that can be supported by a p rice p, satisfying the condit ion for an equilibrium allocation px* = pwi, for ali i = 1, 2, . .. , n. 
Definition 2:
The excess utility function, eu,,u 2 , .. . un ,w : .6 
Assuming conditions such that the solution of the maximization program, involving the social welfare function, will be attained in the interior of IR~, it follows that if x* (.>-, w) is the allocation that solves this problem , we have and t hen In Accinelli (1999) , it is proven that it is a non-empty set. The following theorem summari~es the main result of this approach applied to an economic system with a finite number of agents and goods. ( Accinelli, 1999) .
The allocation x (>-) is an equilibrium allocation if the excess utility function of each agent vanishes at x(.\). This means that .\ is in the equilibrium set
Eq( w), if and only if produces an allocation such that the gradient \7
In this frame , it is possible to define: 
A is the vector of social weights, eu,w is the excess idility function , and J eu,w (A)
denotes the jacobian of this function, (Accinelli, 1999) .
When rank J eu,w ( .\) = n -1, we are in prcscnce of a Regular Economy.
Examp les of Singular and Regular Economies
Collsider the following econornic system cornposcd of two agents and two goods:
and thc initial cnclowmcnts: w1 = (w11 , w12), w2 = (w2 1 , w22), for consumer 1, and 2 respectivcl_v (this cxam ple, with a= 8 is givcn in Mas-Colell , Whinston, and Green, 1995 ).
The cxccss utility fun ction of this systcm (scc the Appendix) is :
when a = 12, we obtain forw 1 = (2,r), andw2 = (r,2) withr = three Walrasian equilibrium if utilities are chosen in this neighborhood. This is illustrated in figure l.a.
If we assume a = 5, we obtain only one equilibrium with .>. = (0.5, 0.5), and we will not observe significant changes due to little changes of this value of a. But if a* = 7. 76, and we consider an E-neighborhood of a* for fixed endowments w, then there exist different values of a where the excess utility function ea,w(>-) has a different number of zeros. For this value a*, we say that the utility functions generate a singular economy, because in a neighborhood of this function there exist utility functions such that the respective excess utility function has a different number of zeros, and then the economy is structurally unstable in the sense that, a small change in the tastes of one consumer implies a qualitative, and quantitative change in the structure of the Walrasian equilibrium set. The cardinality of the equilibrium set changes from one to three, or reciprocally.
The first case is a regular economy that is obtained from a type of utility functions, and in the second case the economy is singular because the consumers have another type of utility functions. Then, in the first case, sorne changes in tastes, or mistakes in the consideration of utilities do not imply big differences in the expected behavior of the economy. Whereas in the second case, little mistakes in the measurement of the utilities of the agents, or small changes in tastes have implicit unpredictable consequences.
Figure l.b shows changes in the equilibrium set when the parameter a changes, the bifurcation point is a = 7. 76, for smaller values we can observe only one equilibrium .>. =' = (0.5, 0.5), whereas beyond this point two new equilibrium branches appear. If we consider an economy with the same kind of utility functions as in the example, and the endowments w11 = 2; w12 = O. 75; w21 = r; w22 = 2, we obtain the possibility of more sudden changes. Figure 2 .a shows the equilibrium values of this economy, and figure 2.b shows the bifurcation point a* = 8.81. If a ~ a* we observe that the economy has three branches, but when a < a*, two of these branches disappear, and we obtain only one equilibrium value for .>., and only one equilibrium branch, see figure 4. The possibility of sudden, and big changes in the equilibrium set is clear for economies in a neighborhood of this value. As all measures imply mistakes, the behavior of this kind of economies is absolutely unpredictable. These are well known properties of this space (see for instance Royden, 1963 ).
As we focus in utilities, and the implications that changes in utilities have on the economy regarding the number of equilibria, abruptness of the change of equilibria, etcetera; we will then <leal with the relationship between the kind of excess utility functions, and their zeros. We will say that, an economy 1/ is in a 8-neighborhood, Uó, of an economy E, if the corresponding utilities u., , and u.,1 satisfy llu., -u.,1 1 1 < 8, with the cr uniform topology. It follows that the economies E, and é 1 are in a Uó, with cr uniform topology, if and only if in a neighborhood of an equilibrium, the respective excess utility functions e , ande' are in a 8-neighborhood: lle -e'll < 8, with the cr-l uniform topology.
We can say that a utility function for given endowments w is singular, if in a neighborhood of this function, considering the compact uniform convergence, there exist utility functions such that the respective excess utility functions have a different number of zeros, i.e. , a different number of Walrasian equilibria. Change on the cardinality of the equilibriurn set 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 parameter a1 pna Another possible kind of bifurcation, the figure on the left shows a dramatic situation.
As the excess utility function satisfies the Walras law, .>..eu ,w(.>..) = O, and
as we can consider ¿7= 1 .>..i = 1 (see Accinelli, 1996) , then in the case of an Rccall that if .f : X ---> 1R is a smooth map, a point p E x is a critica! point if .f' (p) : X ---> 1R is not onto . It is a well known fact that the set of Morse functions is a residual set in C 00 (X, JR) (see Golubitsky, and Guillemin, 1973) . D e fi n it io n 6: f, ande in C 00 (X, (X, su ch that all e E W f are equivalent to .f.
We will say t hat an economy is stable, if the excess utility function is a stablc rnap in the sense of Golubitsky, and Guillernin (1973) indicatcd above. So, if an cconomy is stable, thc grafic representation of its excess utility function is similar to the cxcess ut ilities of the cconomics in which t he tastcs of the consumers are similar. The tastes of the agents are similar if the utilitics that reprcsent these tastes are in 8-ncighborhood.
The following theorem is helpful in characterizing the behavior of the economies in a neighborhood of a singular economy, when we assume that an econorny E 1 is in the neighborhood of an economy E, if and only if the excess utility function e' of E 1 is in a neighborhood of the excess utility function e of E.
From the mathematical point of view, the theorem sets that the stability in the function space with uniform convergence topology is equivalent to the Morse functions characterized by the fact that its critica! points have separated images. This means that, generically, the set of singular economies have one and only one singular equilibrium, and this singularity is a fold. The proof of this theorem can be found in Golubitsky, and Guillemin (1973) .
On the other hand, it is a well known fact in Morse theory that the set of functions whose singularities are non degenerates is an open and dense set, and non degenera te critica! points are isolated. Thus, generically, singular economies are stablc.
Example ofMorse Excess Utility Function, and Singular Economy
The example below shows a two consumers economy, whose excess utility function represents a singular, and regular economy. This is a singular economy, i. e., in ali neighborhood of its excess utility function there are economies with a different number of equilibria.
Therefore, figures l.a, and 2.a show a generic case of a two agent economy. The excess utility function of each agent is a Morse function (see Appendix), these functions have Jacobian of complete rank, and if they could have critica! equilibrium points, these points would have different values which are not degenerates. This means that a singular economy will have only one singular, and no degenerate equilibrium. That is, if utilities, and endowments are given, there will be generically only one set of social weight, >. = (5. 1 , 5. 2 ) such that ei,a,w(>.i) = O, and aei,a,w(>.i)/a>..i = O. On the other hand, in any neighborhood of an excess utility function, ei,a,w, that is a Morse function, corresponding to a singular economy, there exist excess utility functions, ei,a' ,w, such that for each one of them, the primage of zero has three different points ( each one of thesc three points is a regular equilibria for a regular economy, whose excess utility function is ei,a',w)· Additionally, excess utility functions, ei,a,w, that vanish at only one point, corresponding to a regular economy with only one regular equilibrium, and whose excess utility function is ei ,a,w· To see this, it is enough to consider small modifications in the value of the parameter a.
Recall that in the two consumers case it is enough to consider only one coordina te of the excess utility function. If the excess utility function e : [O, 1] -+ lR of the economy E is a Morse function, ali of whose critica! values are distinct, then this excess utility fun ct ion belongs to a residual set in C 00 (X, lR). Moreover from the theorem abovc, it follows that, this excess utility is a stable function in the sense that , t hcre is a neighborhood We of e, such that all functions e' E C 00 (X, IR) in this neighborhood will be equivalent to e. In spite of this, the singular equilibrium can disappear if there occurs a change in the tastes of the consumer, then all economy E 1 in a neighborhood of E will have equivalent excess utility functions.
If the economy is singular, and the excess utility function has more than one singular equilibrium, that is if there are more than one critical point, >.} =/= >-r, where e(>.}) = e(>.r) = O, then there will not be a stable economy, that means that we can not say anything about the behavior of the economies in a neighborhood of the singular economy.
The stable functions in C 00 (X, IR) have a non-degenerate form since these are just the classical Morse functions . Such functions can only have one type of singularities ( i. e., have only non-degenerate critical points, see Golubitsky, and Guillemin, 1973) . Stable maps are also dense in C 00 (X, IR), this property is also verified for functions in C 00 (X, Y), if X and Y are manifolds such that dimX = dimY = 2, but unfortunately this is not the case if we consider C 00 (X, Y) for an arbitrary manifold Y (see Accinelli, and Puchet, 2001 ). The general answer depends on the relative dimensions of X and Y. This means that, in sorne cases there can exist one generic economy E', such that in all neighborhoods Ws' of
E:
1 , there exists an economy E, su ch that has a non-equivalent behavior, i. e., the respective utility functions are not equivalent. Such posibility depends on the relative dimensions of the consumption space X, and the number of agents in . the economy.
However if the economy is regular (i.e., the excess utility function e : IRn -l --> IRn-l is an immersion one to one) then e is a stable map. We will finish this section by indicating the existence of certain dual behavior in the singular economies. To see this let us consider a parametrized excess utility function e : IRx,~+• xO --> IRn-l, where ~+is the simplex, O is the consumption space, and n is the number of agents in the economy. Let e (a, >., w) be the excess utility function of E, then, if the economy is singular in the sense of the utility functions, this means that if endowments w E O are fixed, and small changes in tastes imply changes in the number of equilibria, then the economy is singular in the sense of the endowments for utilities fixed, this means that in a neighborhood of w there are economies with different number of equilibria.
Examples of Economies that depend on the Initial Endowments
As mentioned above, in the traditional sense the properties of the economies in a neighborhood of a singular economy depend on variable initial endowments while, as it is well known, utilities are fixed. This case is shown in an example where we consider a = 8, w21 = r, but we allow changes in w12- Figure  3 shows this case, the singularities are economies such that w12 = 0.769, or w 12 = 0.7730. In all neighborhoods of this points, we observe changes in the number of equilíbria. Now allow us to modify the values of a. As figure 3 .a shows, the behavior of the economy changes. For values of a lower t han 7. 767, the possibility of changes in the number of equilibria disapp ear, and we obtain economies with uniqueness of equilibrium for all values of w 1 2 , and t hen there are no singularities, nevertheless in a neighborhood of a = 7. 767 and endowments given, we can observe big changes in the equilibrium set for small changes in ut ilit ies, for instance, for small changes in the values of a. This situat ion is well known in economics. 
Endowment omega 12
A well known situation, w hen a singular economy appears, changes in the endowments in a neighborhood of t his singularity give rise to changes in the number of equilibria.
From the point of view of the singularity theory, we can consider the function e as a function from the space formed by the cartesian product U x D x D. in IRn-l , and to consider changes in tastes or in endowment. An economy will be singular if it has critical points (singular Walrasian equilibria), i.e. if for sorne>: E D. , eu,w(>:) = O, and rank Jeu,w < n -l. In a neighborhood of these economies, small changes in tastes or endowments may imply big changes in the behavior of the economy, for instance, changes in the number of Walrasian equilibria, and in its geometrical representation. Figure 4 shows different kinds of equilibrium sets for economies with different sets of utilities, . this differences were obtained by changing the parameter a. The doted curve shown in figure  4 represents the equilibrium set of an economy with a singular equilibrium, it separates regular economies with uniqueness of equilibrium for all values of the endowments, from economies such that the number of equilibria changes with the values of the endowments.
Conclusions
The existence of singularities is the support of the irreversibility. Small changes in endowments or tastes can imply big changes, and after these big changes turning back is only possible if the society makes concerted efforts.
The existence of singularities may be an answer to an ambitious question like: Why do crisis exist? If this result about t he existence of singular economies could be a real possibility to explain crises, then a crisis would be the result of the structural conditions, and not a result of exogenous movements in fundamentals. We believe this to be t he main motivation to analyze the structural characteristics of different kinds of singula rit ies. Nevertheless, the knowledge of the kind of possible singularities in a n economy allows us to characterize the kind of the unforseen future, wich in sorne sense means to have additional information. 
Endowment omega 12
Variations in . the values of the parameter a produce economies with qualitatively d~fferent equilibrium sets.
Economies with the same possible singularities will show a similar behavior. If there are no big changes in the neighborhood of regular economies, significative changes do occur in a neighborhood of a singularity, and this kind of changes are an important characterization of the economy. Finally, we would like to bring into consideration the existing duality, between the change of tastes and the change in the endowments, as generators of steep changes in the economy. Singularities can app ear from tastes or from the distribution of the initial resources of the society. In sorne cases, small mistakes in the measurement of the endowments, or in the tastes of the agents, can lead to unexpected, and irreversible results. Substituting this value in the first derivative, we obtain that implying the equality a -1 ---= w12· l+a Now consideran economy where w12 = w21, it then fotlows that e,, 1 ,w 1 (1) =O.
So, if a = (1 + w12)/ (1 -w 1 2), and w 1 2 = w2 1 , the excess utility function of the economy given in the example is a non Morse function, and then the economy is a degenerate singular economy, where .A. 1 = .A. 2 = ~ is a singular degenerate equilibrium social weight.
